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OTTENHEIMER v. WHITAKER

relief will only be granted where changes have occurred,
other than by breach of the restrictions," which destroy
the original intent of the subdivision. The justification for
this statement is not immediately evident; but if it is but a
manner of stating that when a party seeking relief from
the restrictions has been guilty of prior breaches himself
he will be denied relief on the "clean hands doctrine", it
is a valid consideration. If it is to be literally interpreted,
it may well result in a disregard of many of the changes
occurring within the subdivision which are the very factors
generally conceded to be most potent. If the latter be the
true interpretation it is noticeable that the court made no
mention of this principle in the instant case.
From this discussion it may be concluded that building
restrictions may be determined solely by extrinsic forces.
The Maryland decisions and the weight of authority seem
firmly dedicated to the principle that originally valid covenants running with the land may be extinguished by changing physical forces beyond the control of the interested
parties, which so effectively conflict with the original
scheme of development as to make its purpose no longer
obtainable and continued enforcement "oppressive and inequitable". That the ultimate application of this principle
is primarily a factual one is but a truism. The relevant
factors are the size of the restricted property, its location
in reference to where the change has occurred, the conduct
of the parties and their predecessors, the nature of the
change that has taken place, the purpose for which the
restriction was imposed, and to some extent the unexpired
term of the restrictions.

RIGHTS OF A TRUSTEE OF BANKRUPT ESTATE TO
ABANDON BURDENSOME ASSETS IN CONTRAVENTION OF FEDERAL NAVIGATION ACTS
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker1
In the principal case a most unusual and novel set of
circumstances was presented to the court. The appellant,
trustee in Bankruptcy of the Eastern Transportation Company had petitioned the Referee in Bankruptcy for leave
to abandon, as burdensome assets of the estate, three obso-

3Norris

v. Williams, 189 Md. 73, 54 A. 2d 331, 4 A. L. R. 2d 1106 (1947).

'198 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir., 1952).
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lete and badly damaged barges situated in Baltimore Harbor. In his petition the trustee alleged that he had made
diligent efforts through public sale to dispose of these
barges but had been unsuccessful. He further alleged that
it was necessary to employ a man to continually pump
these barges in order to keep them from sinking. The
trustee took the position that inasmuch as these barges were
not assets, but actually liabilities, of the estate, he should
be granted permission to abandon them where they lay at
anchor. The Referee in Bankruptcy found the facts to be as
stated and accordingly signed an order authorizing the trustee to abandon the barges at their present location, thereby
revesting title to them in the bankrupt. Upon a petition for
hearing by Colonel Whitaker, the District Engineer, United
States Corps of Engineers and the Harbor Engineer of Baltimore City, the United States District Court held that a
trustee in Bankruptcy in order to save expense could not
deliberately abandon and allow to sink obsolescent barges
in navigable waters, but was required to remove them
under the direction of the United States District Engineer,
the cost of said removal to be born by the bankrupt
estate.2 On appeal the United States Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the District Court denying permission to abandon and furthermore requiring that the
barges be removed at the expense of the estate.
The trustee contended that it was his duty as a court
appointed officer to marshal and protect the assets of the
bankrupt estate and to liquidate these assets as expeditiously as possible in order to secure funds for distribution
among general creditors. He relied heavily upon the well
settled judge made rule that a trustee in bankruptcy may
decline to accept property which would be burdensome and
unprofitable to the estate and that the trustee may within
a reasonable time elect whether or not he wishes to accept
the assets and administer them. The government on the
other hand contended that the right to abandon assets of a
bankrupt estate is not an absolute right, but is discretionary
with the court, and that when it is found that such abandonment will result in the violation of a Federal statute it
should not be allowed. The government relied on the provisions of the so called "Wreck Act", which in effect makes
2In re Eastern Transportation Company, 102 F. Supp. 913 (D. C., Md.,
1952).
' Dushane v. Beall, 161 U. S. 513 (1896) ; First National Bank v. Lasater,
196 U. S. 115 (1905); Central States Life Ins. v. Koplar Co., 80 F. 2d 754
(8th Cir., 1935), cert. den., 298 U. S. 687 (1936).
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it a criminal act for anyone to hinder or obstruct the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.4
The court was faced with the policy decision of whether
to give effect to a well settled judge made law of the bankruptcy court or to enforce a Federal statute prohibiting
obstruction of navigable waters. In holding the Federal
statute paramount under the circumstances a unanimous
court, speaking through Judge Soper said:
"It seems obvious to us that a rule which is not
provided by statute but built up by the Courts to facilitate the administration and distribution of the assets
of a bankrupt estate should not be extended so as to
reach such an unreasonable and unjust result. The
judge-made rule must give way when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in order to insure the safety
of navigation; for we are not dealing with a burden
imposed upon the bankrupt or his property by contract,
but a duty and a burden imposed upon an owner of
vessels by an Act of Congress in the public interest."5
The Bankruptcy Act 8 vests in the trustee by operation of
law the title to all property held by the bankrupt except
property which has been exempted under various Federal
and State laws. The Act itself is silent as to the rights of
'The following sections of the Act were particularly stressed by the
government:
33 U. S. C. A., See. 403.
This section deals generally with the obstruction of navigable
waters. It provides that "The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the
waters of the United States is ... prohibited; ..
33 U. S. C. A., See. 406.
This section provides that every person or corporation who violates
Section 403 "Shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500, nor
less than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person)
not exceeding one year, or by both such punishments, in the discretion of the court." This section also provides that the removal of any
structure erected in violation of Section 403, "may be enforced by
the injunction of any district court exercising jurisdiction in any district in which such structures may exist ...
33 U. S. C. A., See. 409.
This section provides that "it shall not be lawful to tie up or anchor
vessels or other craft in navigable channels in such a manner as to
prevent or obstruct the passage of other vessels or craft; or to voluntarily or carelessly sink, or permit or cause to be sunk, vessels or other
craft in navigable channels ; ..
33 U. S. C. A., See. 411.
This section makes a violation of Section 409 a misdemeanor and
provides penalties similar to those provided by Section 406 for violation of Section 403.
5Supra, n. 1, 290.
611 U. S. C. A., See. 110(a) (70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act).
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the trustee to abandon burdensome property although it
does provide that the trustee may assume or reject any
executory contract, including unexpired leases of real property.7 This right of the trustee to abandon property has
been traced back to the original English Bankruptcy Act
of 1869 which specifically gave to the trustee one year from
the date of his appointment within which he could by informal writing disclaim title to the property.8
One of the earliest United States cases to recognize this
right in the trustee to abandon burdensome assets was
American File Company v. Garrett.9 In that case the question involved was the liability of assignees in bankruptcy
in respect to shares of stock which had been held by the
bankrupt and whether the title to the stock had so devolved
upon the assignees as to make them, or the assets in their
hands, liable for the individual liability of the stockholders
for the debts of the corporation. The court after citing
several English cases said:
"It has long been a recognized principle of the bankrupt laws that the assignees were not bound to accept
property of an onerous or unprofitable character....
As the assignees of Chapman never accepted the stock,
and never consented to become stockholders in the
American File Company, it follows that neither they
nor the assets of Chapman in their hands are subject
to the individual liability of stockholders for the debt
of the corporation.' ' 10
Generally the trustee is given a reasonable time within
which to decide whether to keep the property and administer it as part of the bankrupt's estate or to decline to accept
it, thereby revesting title in the bankrupt. Abandonment
is always discretionary with the court and if it be found
that the trustee unwisely exercised his election, the bankruptcy court can compel a different course. In Brown v.
O'Keefe," a suit was brought by the receiver of a Federal'
bank to enforce a personal liability imposed by the statute
then in force upon shareholders in national banks. The
defendant bankrupt disclaimed all liability on the grounds
that before assessment of the shareholders his ownership
of the shares had been divested by the filing of a bankruptcy
Ibid, Sec. 110(b)

(70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act).
(14th ed., 1940), Sec. 70.42, p. 1217, n. 3.
'110 U. S. 288 (1884).
Ibid, 295.
"300 U. S. 598 (1937).
64

COLLiER, BANKRUPTCY
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petition and the appointing of a trustee thereunder. Mr.
Justice Cardozo in disposing of this contention said:
"Whatever title or inchoate interest may have passed
to the trustee was extinguished by relation as of the
filing of the petition when the trustee informed the
court that the shares were burdensome assets, and was
directed by the court to abandon and disclaim them....
In such case 'the title stands as if no assignment had
been made'."' 2
Later in the opinion an analogy is found in the law of gifts
where acceptance is presumed,
"but rejection leaves the title by relation as if the gift
had not been made."'"
Frequent examples of a situation wherein the trustee declines to accept assets are cases wherein the bankrupt
property is burdensome
because encumbered with liens in
14
excess of its value.

It is interesting to note that section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 5 gives the trustee a period of 60 days within
which to assume or reject any executory contracts including unexpired leases of real property. If the trustee does
not affirmatively assume or reject the executory contract
within this 60 day period, it is deemed to be rejected. As to
all other property it is presumed that the trustee will not
find such property too burdensome to be retained for purposes of liquidation. The mere fact that the property may
possibly be burdensome does not in itself prevent the title
thereto from vesting in the trustee under Section 70(a).16
Thus, as a practical difference, in cases of executory contracts and unexpired leases of real property there is a presumption in favor of disclaimer, whereas, as to all other
assets there is no such presumption and the trustee if he
wishes to reject these assets must affirmatively disclaim
in every case. The proper method to effect an abandonment
is, as was done in the principal case, for the trustee to file
a formal petition for leave to abandon and get an order
thereon.
The court's opinion in the principal case denying to the
trustee the right to abandon the barges because to do so
Ibid, 602.
Ibid.

14 Federal

Land Bank of Berkeley v. Nalder, 116 F. 2d 1004 (10th Cir.,
1941), cert. den., 313 U. S. 578 (1941).
"Supra, n. 7.
82 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed., 1940), Sec. 1144.
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would violate certain Federal statutes relating to navigation is a recognition of the paramount national interest.
Although it is unfortunate that a bankrupt estate is involved, it is an urgent necessity that the harbor and channel
facilities of the Port of Baltimore, which handles such a
tremendous volume of seagoing traffic, be kept constantly
open and unmenaced by obstacles to free navigation. The
Court in its opinion stated that if the barges had sunk and
become an obstruction to the passage of other vessels that:
".. . it might well be held that the bankrupt or the..
trustee had become liable to the punishment of fine or
imprisonment prescribed by the statute for the person
who voluntarily or carelessly allows a vessel to be sunk
in a navigable channel."' 7
With this possibility, a very practical problem can arise
in situations where a criminal penalty may attach to the
ownership and handling of property and the trustee cannot
abandon such property.'" Would any person care to assume
the duties of trustee where such assets are involved? This
could be particularly so if the probable funds of the bankrupt estate were too perilously slim to pay for such proper
handling as may be necessary. It is difficult to imagine a
person who, aware of this possibility, would knowingly
consent to serve as trustee. If this happens, who will administer the bankrupt estate?
It would seem that a possible dilemma could easily arise
to which no easy solution is apparent. If there are insufficient funds in the bankrupt estate to pay the costs of meeting statutory demands, it is unlikely that private contractors would care to undertake the task with financial loss a
foregone conclusion. Obviously it is unreasonable to expect
a trustee to spend money out of his own pocket. If the
bankrupt has made an honest disclosure and surrender of
his assets, he will not have the necessary money, and if he
receives his discharge he should be freed of further liability.
The government itself could probably best stand the loss
if it would undertake to do the necessary work and be
reimbursed to the extent that the funds of the bankrupt
estate would permit. However, there is difficulty in finding
statutory authority which would permit the government to
incur the possible substantial loss.
1'

198 F. 2d 289, 290.
Supra, n. 4.

